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Ca s e No • I 8 1 7 8 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action in which the plaintiffs Anderson seek to have their trust deed 
declared prior to or equal in priority to the American Savings' and Loan Association's 
trust deed on Lot 17 A-D of the Westhampton Planned Unit Development. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
American Savings' Motion for Summary Judgment was granted. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
American Savings seeks to have the Order granting summary judgment affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACT~ 
The Andersons had purchased Units No. 4A-D, Westhampton Planned Unit 
Development from Great West Development Company for the sum of $15,000.00 
(Stipulated Statement of Facts paragraph R. 12). These units had been platted, but there 
had been no c:onstruction on the tmits. Thereafter Anderson sold Units No. 4A-D back to 
Great West Development and executed a special Warranty Deed dated April 30, 1979, 
deeding Units 4A-D to Great West Development. On May 1, 1979, the Andersons received 
the sum of $21,000.00 for Units 4A-D from which they paid a real estate commission of 
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$5,100.00. Said funds were derived from a loan by American Savings and Loan and were 
disbursed by Utah Title and Abstract Company (R.13, paragraph 8). As additional 
consideraticn for the sale of Units 4A-D Anderson received a trust deed Note in the sum 
of $30,000.00 from Great West Development. Said note was secured by a trust deed on 
Units 17 A-D (paragraph 8). Therefore, approximately eight months after purchasing 
Units 4A-D for $15,000.00, the Andersons sold them back to the developer for 
$51,000.00. 
Four individuals, Larry D. Myers, Larry J. Price, Roy L. Huggard and Ronald J, 
Howard (hereinafter referred to as "The Principals") who were the principals of Great 
West Development arranged for a construction loan from American Savings and Loan 
Association. The Principals executed a trust deed to American Savings and Loan on April 
4, 1979, in anticipation of a loan (R. 13, paragraph 4). A condition for t"le loan was the 
clearing of title to the Westhampton PUD so that American Savings and Loan Association 
would have a first trust deed position on the entire Planned Unit Development. Great 
West then made arrangements to buy back the units they had previously sold, including 
the Andersons' Units 4A-D. Those units were purchased with the proceeds of the loan 
from American Savings and Loan Association. In order for American Savings and Loan 
Association to obtain a first position, and to clear title to all the units which had been 
previously conveyed, it was necessary that the documents and funds all be placed in 
escrow tmtil the transactions were completed. A portion of the construction loan money 
was the ref ore placed in escrow to pay Anderson as well as others to clear title to the 
other units of the Westhampton PUD. The principals subsequently defaulted on their 
obligation and American Savings exercised its power of sale under the trust deed. The 
Andersons filed this action seeking to have their interest declared prior to the trust deed 
of American Savings in order to avoid having it cut off by the Trustee's sale. 
-3-
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As the stipulated facts indicate, Utah Title and Abstract Company was instructed 
to record the documents so that title was vested in the Principals so that thereafter the 
trust deed of American Savings and Loan could be recorded in first position {R.13, 
paragraph 6). Then the other trust deeds were recorded including that of the 
Andersons. Because the Andersons had accepted their trust deed from Great West 
Development Corporation, it was nece$ary that the principals of that corporation 
execute a deed conveying title back to the corporation, which they did subsequent to the 
initial closing. 
The Ande~sons' statement of facts states that the Principals gave American 
Savings a trust deed at the time that they did not have title. It is true that the trust 
deed was executed prior to title vesting. However, as agreed, an escrow was established 
and no funds were disbursed until record title was appropriately vested in the 
Principals. As paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of the Stipulated Facts { R. 13) indicate the 
American Savings and Loan trust deed was recorded at the time that the Principals did in 
fact have t~tle. The documents were recorded in that order pursuant to the instructions 
given to Utah Title and Abstract Company so that American Savings and Loan 
Association's trust deed was recorded prior to the other trust deeds. 
Paragraph 6 of the Stipulation indicates that Utah Title and Abstract Company 
was instructed to record the documents in the order in which they were in fact recorded, 
so that American Savings and Loan Association would have a first trust deed position on 
the subject property. Andersons have no evidence to contradict the fact that Utah Title 
and Abstract Company did follow its instructions. The parties further stipulated that the 
Andersons had been advised prior to deeding Units 4A-D to Great West Development that 
Great West Develpment was purchasing the property so that it could obtain clear title in 
order to obtain a loan. The Andersons were aware that the lending institution, American 
Savings and Loan Association, required clear title as a condition for making its loan 
{R .14, paragraph 1 O ). 
-4-
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The Andersons have acknowledged that they knew and were aware that their Units 
4A-D were being purchased for the reason that the developer needed a construction loan 
and that the construction loan could not be obtained unless American Savings and Loan 
Association was given a first trust deed position. In their deposition the Andersons said 
that they did not agree to subordinate their Units 17 A-D. In point of fact, their trust 
deed to those tmits was never subordinated. American Savings' position was prior from 
the begiming. 
In summary, we have a situation in which American Savings and Loan required a 
first trust deed position if it was to make a construction loan. The developers used part 
of the American Savings and Loan Association loan proceeds to cash out the Anderson's 
$21,000.00 so that the Andersons received the retum of all of their cash investment plus 
commission. The Andersons were aware that the reason the developer was purchasing 
back the tmit was so that it could get clear title to obtain this loan. The Andersons 
stated in their depositions that they understood American Savings and Loan Association 
wanted a first trust deed position on the entire PUD. The documents were intended to be 
recorded so that American Savings and Loan did in fact have a first trust deed position 
and were recorded in that order. The Andersons admit that they were told that 
American Savings and Loan wanted a first trust deed position and that clear title was a 
condition of the loan. The Andersons admit that they knew their original tmits were 
being purchased so that American Savings conditions concerning title could be met. The 
Andersons do, however, state that they did not agree that their trust deed in the second 
units would be subordinated. In fact, their trust deed was not subordinated. 1'here was 
never any discussion of subordination. 
With regard to the Fourth Cause of Action, the Affidavit of David Kimball of 
American Savings and Loan Association was filed with the court in accordance with Rule 
56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. His detailed Affidavit shows affirmatively that 
American Savings and Loan met its responsibilites pursuant to the Construction Loan 
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Agreement and its other documents. There were no opposing affidavits filed by the 
Andersons. 
ARGUMENT I 
THE AMERICAN SAVINGS DEED OF TRUST, HAVING BEEN RECORDED PRIOR IN 
TIME IS PRIOR TO THE ANDERSON TRUST DEED. 
The Andersons characterize the fact that the American Savings's trust deed was in 
fact recorded prior in time as merely that American Savings' trust deed had a "lower 
recording number". The Andersons' first argument is that their trust deed is prior 
because the Principals received title after having already signed the trust deed to 
American Savings. In fact, the Principals received title from Great West pursuant to a 
Warranty Deed, dated April 30, 1979 which was recorded prior to the trust deed from 
Great West to the Andersons, also dated April 30, 1979, but which was recorded 
subsequently. Pursuant to the Utah Recording Statute, 57-3-2 Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 as amended, the deed recorded prior in time in fact has priority. Therefore, the 
Warranty Deed, dated April 30, from Great West Development to the Principals was 
recorded prior in time and therefore has priority over the trust deed from Great West 
Development to the Andersons. 
Anderson brief states that the only alternative is to say that the Andersons 
received an "empty trust deed" and that there was a fraud perpetrated upon them. The 
Andersons then, conclude that this would be contrary to human experience and is 
therefore "unreasonable". (Appelant's Brief, page 7). In attempting to construct an 
argument the Andersons have ignored the fact that within two weeks of the initial 
closing, the Principals deeded the property back to their corporation, Great West 
Development, thereby making the Andersons' trust deed a valid second trust deed in 
accordance with the after-acquired title doctrine set forth in §57-1-20 Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
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American Savings does not believe that there was any intent by the Principals or 
Great West to defraud the Andersons, and in fact the Andersons were not defrauded. In 
any event, there is no evidence whatsoever of any intent to defraud. It is ironic that the 
situation the Andersons consider to be an unreasonable, fraudulent and preposterous when 
applied to them, is the very intrepretation they suggest concerning American Savings' 
trust deed. Ignoring the escrow nature of the transaction and provisions of §57-1-20, the 
Andersons have argued that the American Savings trust deed is not valid because the 
Principals received title after having signed the trust deed. 
On page seven of their Brief, the Andersons state that the "most reasonable 
construction of the record title" is that nplaintiffs obtained their trust deed from their 
grantors prior to the time that defendant received its trust deed from the grantees of 
plaintiffs' granters." The record title de-monstrates exactly the opposite. As has been 
indicated above, the Principals received title via a Warranty Deed recorded prior to the 
recordation of the trust deed from Great West Development to the Andersons. "So also, 
the rights of a grantee in a deed are prima facie superior to those of a mortgagee in an 
earlier mortgage,- if the deed is first recorded". 66 AmJur 2d 457, Records and 
Recording Laws §179. 
The last paragraph of the Andersons' first argument states a number of facts not 
in the record or contrary to the record. First, the Andersons assume that Utah Title and 
Abstract Company was American Savings' agent. Utah Title acted as closing escrow 
agent and did receive instructions to record the documents in the order that they were 
recorded. Paragraph six of the Stipulation does not state who gave Utah Title those 
instructions. Even if American Savings and Loan Associatin gave Utah Title and 
Abstract Company those instructions, it would not show general agency but would merely 
indicate normal escrow services provided by title companies. The Andersons go on to 
argue that the only reasonable construction of the documents was that the Andersons 
received the trust deed prior to the American Savings receiving its trust deed. This is a 
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conclusion without a factual basis. There is not one shred of evidence in the record to 
indicate that Anderson's trust deed was prior to American Savings trust deed. All of the 
evidence is to the contrary. The Andersons assume that they have a first trust deed 
position and that therefore, a subordination agreement was necessary. In fact, it is 
common practice to record documents in a specified order as was done in this case. A 
subordination agreement would be necessary only if the Andersons' trust deed had 
previously been recorded. 
ARGUMENT II 
AMERICAN SAVINGS' TRUST DEED WAS RECORDED PRIOR TO THE ANDERSON'S 
TRUST DEED. THEY WERE NOT RECORDED AT THE SAME TIME AND ARE NOT 
SIMULTANEOUS. 
The Andersons claim that because the trust deeds were stamped with the same 
minute, that they are simultaneously recorded. This ignores the obvious fact that a 
minute is broken into sixty seconds. Section 57-3-2 states that notice is imparted "from 
the time of filing" [emphasis added1. It does not state from the minute stamped. It also 
ignores the obvious fact that it is possible to stamp in many documents at the Recorders 
Office within the same minute. In this particular transaction, there were 21 documents 
submitted for recording. There is tllldisputed evidence that the documents were 
submitted to the County Recorder in the order intended and not haphazardly or 
simultaneously. Further, the person who submitted the documents for recording has 
signed an undisputed affidavit that he intended the documents to be recorded in exactly 
the order they were intended for the purpose of giving the documents the priority as 
determined by the District Court. 
The general rule concerning priority of mortgages is that the mortgage recorded 
first has priority. Section 245 of 59 C.J.S. states: "As a general rule the mortgage first 
recorded takes priority over other mortgages on the same property." In Section 179, 66 
AmJur 2d 457 it is stated: 
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A mortgage first recorded is prima facie entitled to be 
pref erred over a mortgage subsequently recorded unless for 
some reason the first is fraudulent and void as to the other. 
In the absence of any showing to the contrary, mortgages by 
the same person on the same land presented for record are 
presumtively to be accorded priority in the order in which they 
are numbered by the recorder. 
The law in the State of Utah is clear that a document recorded first takes 
priority. Section 57-3-2 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). See also Wilson v. 
Schneiter's Riverside Golf Course, 523 P. 2d 1226 (Utah 197 4). Anderson makes reference 
to the fact that American Savings's argument is based on the fact that it has a "lower 
recording number". This is true to the extent that the low recording number reflects the 
fact that the American Savings trust deed was recorded first. It is not the lower number 
which gives priority but in fact, the earlier recording. 
The Andersons argue that there can be a practical problem if documents are 
received at the same instant, one in fact, would have to be recorded prior to the other. 
That is an interesting observation. The undisputed facts in this case, however, are that 
the documents were not presented for recorda tion at the same instant, nor were they 
received at the same instant. Rather, the documents were presented in the order in 
which they were recorded, purposely and intentionally for the purpose of having them 
recorded in the exact order in which they were recorded. 
The essence of the plaintiffs' case is that because the documents are stamped with 
the same minute, it means that the documents were conclusively filed simultaneously. In 
Pennsylvania case cited by the Andersons, Bonstein v. Schwever 61 A. 447 (Pa. 1905) is 
therefore distinguishable. In that case, two mortgages were left at the office at the 
same moment and neither had priority. The Court stated that the mortgage lien on the 
land under the law then applicable in Pennsylvania "commences from that time of t~ 
--~day" 61 Atlantic at 448. The Pennsylvania statute as cited by the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court is therefore different from the Utah Statute. In the case befo~e the court, the 
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documents were recorded at different times and were properly recorded sequentually. 
To hold otherwise would require the Recorders Office to file only one document per 
minute, an impa;sible situation in a county such as Salt Lake. 
Defendant submits that a rule of law which would require that only one document 
(in a complex transaction) be recorded per minute, is neither practical nor in accordance 
wi~h established practice. Furthermore, the plaintiffs' suggestion that there should have 
been subordination agreements is without merit. Most subordination agreements specify 
the book, page and entry number of the document to which the subordination is being 
made in order to impart full notice .of the transaction. In this case it would not have 
been possible to provide the neces;ary specificity regarding recording information. The 
common practice in the state is to record documents in the order of priority, as was done 
in this transaction. 
AGRUMENT ID· 
THE ANDERSONS' MORTGAGE IS NOT A PURCHASE MONEY MORTGAGE. 
Plaintiffs claim that their trust deed is a purchase money mortgage. In fact, if 
either trust deed qualifies as a purchase money mortgage, it is that of American 
Savings. The Andersons sold Units 4A-D and took a trust deed back on Units 17 A-D. 
Units 4A-D were purchased from the plaintiffs with funds supplied by American Savings 
and Loan Association. American Savings and Loan Association also supplied the funds for 
the repurchase of the rest of the Planned Unit Development including- Units 17 A-D. The 
Principals purchased the entire Planned Unit Development through use of American 
Savings's loan proceeds in order to put American Savings in first position. Therefore, 
since Units 17 A-D were acquired from Great West Development by the Principals with 
the proceeds of the loan from the American Savings, American Savings has a purchase 
money mortgage. The Andersons assert their claim that one can obtain a purchase 
money mortgage with respect to property that one did not sell or provide the funds to 
purchase. Plaintiffs further assert that this is a case of first impression. Apparently, 
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others have tried the same approach. In Miller v. Miller, 232 N. W. 498 (1930) the 
Supreme Court of Iowa, quoting Black's Law Dictionary, stated: 
The purchase money mortgage is a mortgage given 
concurrently with the conveyance of land by the vendee to the 
vendor on the same land to secure the unpaid balance of the 
purchase price. [emphasis added.] 
In Loretz v. Cal-Coast Development Corp., 57 Cal Reporter 188, (Ct of App. 1st 
Dist. 1967) the California Court of Appeals discussed the situation where the buyer 
executed a Promissory Note as part of the consideration for the purchase of a motel. A 
Deed of Trust was not taken on the motel, but rather on a lot unrelated to the motel. 
The Court of Appeals stated: 
Because the security was on land other than that being bought, 
it is not to be deemed a purchase money security. Id at 189. 
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th edition, page 912 states: 
Purchase monev mortgage. Generally, any mortgage given to 
secure a loan made for the purpose of acquiring the land on 
which the mortgage is given; more particularly, a mortgage 
given to the seller of land to secure payment of a portion of 
the purchase price. A mortgage given, concurrently with a 
conveyance of land, by the vendee to the vendor, on the same 
land, to secure the unpaid balance of the purchase price. 
[Emphasis added]. 
The Andersons cite 55 AmJur 2d Mortgages §348 which states the same rule quite 
clearly. The Anderson then attempts to apply novel interpretations to the plain meaning 
of the legal encylclopedias which they quote. The Andersons s~gest that the plain 
meaning of the definitions be contorted and that words be excised to fit the plaintiffs' 
theory. Significantly, plaintiffs do not cite a single case to support their theory. 
The Andersons did not have a purchase money mortgage. They cannot in good 
conscience state that they have sold lots 17A-D to Great West Development Corp., in 
light of the fact that Great West Development Corp. owned the land prior to selling it to 
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the Principals. Nor did the Andersons lend Great West Development the funds to buy 
Unit 17-A-D. All that Andersons did was to secure funds owing to them with a trust deed 
to Units 17 A-D. 
In any event, a purchase money mortgage does not automatically take priority 
over other financing. See for example Kemo v. Zions First National Bank, 470 P. 2d 39U, 
24 u 2d 288 (1970). 
ARGUMENT IV 
PLAINTIFFS KNEW AND WERE AWARE THAT THE REASON FOR THE PURCHSE OF 
THEIR UNIT BY GREAT WEST WAS TO OBTAIN A FIRST TRUST DEED POSITION FOR 
AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION'S TRUST DEED. 
The admissions by the Andersons in their deposition ma1<e it clear that the 
following is undisputed: 
1. The Andersons knew American Savings and Loan Association wanted a first 
trust deed position on all lots. (Dirk Anderson Deposition R. 98-99); that the reason 
Great West was paying over three times the amount it had sold the unit to the Andersons 
for (less than eight months earlier) was because it had to get a loan from American 
Savings and Loan Association (Dirk Anderson deposition R. 95; Clair Anderson deposition 
R. 127-128) and American Savings required clear title. The following are quotes from 
those depositions, Dirk Anderson deposition, R. 98: 
QUESTION: So you were told American Savings wanted a first trust 
deed position? 
ANSWER: That's what I understood, yes. 
QUESTION: At the closing, did Mr. Myers or anyone else explain 
that to you? 
ANSWER: Not that I can remember. 
QUESTION: But it's possible he did. 
ANSWER: It's possible, yes. 
From R. 99: 
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QUESTION: And you understood that American Savings wanted a 
first trust deed position on all lots? 
ANSWER: Right. 
The depa;ition of Clair Anderson reflects that he had the same understanding as 
his son Dirk. On page 10-12 (R.127-129) Clair Anderson stated: 
QUESTION: Did you then enter into a new transaction with them? 
ANSWER: No. What did happen, they couldn't get the money, and 
then this particular lot we have, why Larry said he had to have this lot so 
they could - they had to get clear title on it according to what he said so 
the bank could get clear title so they could get some more money. He gave 
us this lot 17, and upon completion of that, he would pay us, and we had an 
agreement where that we bought the lot, or he bought the lot back from us 
for $52,000, and from that, he says he would give us - I think he give us 
$21,000 back. He give us our money back, and then - yeah, it was $21,000 
back. And then he was going to proceed from there, and we was supposed 
to get - if he didn't pay that there note by December the 31st, why - it 
was a ten percent note. If he didn't pay for it, then it was 18 percent from 
there on. 
QUESTION: As I understand the deal, he was going to be buying 
Unit four or Lot four back from you? 
ANSWER: Yes, uh-huh (affirmative). 
QUESTION: And the reason was that he needed to have lot four so 
he could borrow further money from the bank; is that right? 
ANSWER: Yeah, so he could get clear title. 
QUESTION: It was your understanding that the bank wanted clear 
title before it would lend any money? 
ANSWER: Yeah. That was my understanding. 
QUESTION: Do you know whether he was doing this with the other 
lots also so he could get clear title to the whole project? 
ANSWER: From what I gathered, he was. He was trying to get 
the rn all - all those lots bought back. I think we were the last one that he 
dealt with. He kept holding off. 
Clair Anderson reiterated the same position on Page 22 (R. 139) of the deposition. 
QUESTION: So it was your understanding that American Savings 
would be lending the money to the developers and the construction 
company so that they could build a fourplex on lot 17? 
ANSWER: Yeah, uh-huh (affirmative). 
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QUESTION: And you were aware that the bank wanted to have clear 
title in order to make that loan? 
ANSWER: Well, I guess. I a~umed they would. 
It is apparent that the Andersons were aware that American Savings and Loan 
wanted clear title. 
Defendant's counsel object to the characterization of their questioning as 
"badgering". In fact, there was no badgering and the Andersons consistently answered 
the same way. The basic concept of the transaction was well understood by the 
Andersons. They were going to be getting a retum of over 300% on an eight month old 
investment. They received all of their investment back in cash - it was only the windfall 
profit they accepted in the form of a note resulting from the fact that American Savings 
and Loan required clear title which they have not received. 
Plaintiffs' essential argument, if accepted, would result in a rule of law that the 
prior recording of the document can be set aside if one of the parties that has a second 
trust deed was under the incorrect impression that the owner of property could give "any 
number of first trust deeds." (Plaintiffs' brief p. 15.) It is clear that the intent of all the 
parties was the same. The Andersons, in their affidavits, indicate that they may not 
have understood certain principles of real estate transactions. But they clearly 
understood what was going to happen and what did happen. The Andersons 
misunderstanding or error cannot be used as an excuse to set aside American Savings and 
Loan's trust deed against which over $600,000.00 was disbursed. 
The Andersons knew not only that American Savings and Loan "wanted" a first 
trust deed position, but that in fact the entire transaction and the profit they expected 
was a result of the fact that the transaction was arranged to give American Savings and 
Loan Association the first trust deed position. The Andersons don't deny that they knew 
that the main reason their Units 4A-D were being purchased was because American 
Savings and Loan demanded clear title and a first trust deed position. That fact cannot 
be ignored. The plaintiffs understood why they were getting so much money for their 
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land and that is because the developer needed it or the developer couldn't obtain money 
to construct the remainder of the project. 
Amei'ican Savings objects to the characterization of the transaction which took 
place as a "sneaky procedure" or an attempt to attain a "sneaky result.n (Plaintiff's Brief 
p. 17). The Andersons knew full well that American Savings and Loan Association would 
not have made the construction loan if American Savings couldn't obtain a first 
position. American Savings and Loan Association did not need any nsneaky" results. 
They did not do anything in a "sneaky" manner. They did what any construction loan 
company would do. They provided the funds which paid the Andersons and other unit 
owners so that American Savings could obtain a first trust deed position. American 
Savings clearly stated that was a requirement. Plaintiffs fully understood this. It does 
not lie in the Andersons mouths to accuse American Savings and Loan of having done 
anything "sneaky". The plaintiffs' individual testimony belies the ~ertion in plaintiff's 
brief ( P. 17) that American Savings and Loan's demand for a first trust deed position is 
"uncomliness" [sic]. 
v 
THE ANDERSONS' FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION WAS PROPERLY DECIDED BY 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Rule !16 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is quite clear. If there are disputed 
facts, the same should be presented by affidavit. The Utah Supreme Court in Dupler vs. 
Yates 10 Ut 2d 251, 351 P.2d 624 (1960) stated: 
The primary purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to 
pierce the allegations of the pleadings, show that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact, although an issue may be raised 
by the pleadings, and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
It is apparent here that the defendant has produced evidence 
that pierces the allegations of the complaint. The plaintiffs 
have not controverted, explained or destroyed that evidence by 
counteraffidavit or otherwise. They have relied upon their 
amended complaint and their proposed amendment to the 
amended compl8.int. 
-15-
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Certainly, if the summary judgment procedure is to be 
effective, it must be held that when adequate proof is 
submitted in support of the motion, the pleadings are not 
sufficient to raise an issue of fact. 
Rule 56 U.R.C.P. is not intended to provide a substitute for the 
regular trial of cases in which there are disputed issues of fact 
upon which the outcome of the litigation depends. And it 
should be invoked with caution to the end that litigants may be 
afforded a trial where there exists between them a bona fide 
dispute of material fact. However, where the moving party's 
evidentiary material is in itself sufficient and the opposing 
party fails to proffer any evidentiary matter when he is 
presumably in a position to do so, the courts should be justified 
in concluding that no genuine issue of fact is present, nor 
would one be present at the trial. 
Upon a motion for summary judgment, the courts ought to 
recognize, as a minimum, that the opposing party produce 
some evidentiary matter in contradiction of the movant's case 
or specify in an affidavit the reason why he cannot do so. 
Where, as the instant case, the materials presented by the 
moving party are sufficient to entitle him to a directed verdict 
and the opposing party fails either to offer counteraffidavits or 
other materials that raise a credible issue or to show that he 
has evidence not then available, summary judgment may be 
rendered for the moving party. 
The record made by the defendant, in support of his motion for 
summary judgment, controverted the unverified allegations in 
the plaintiffs' amended complaint and therefore, in the absence 
of counteraffidavits, no genuine issues of material fact were 
created. 
American Savings filed a detailed affidavit setting forth numerous documents 
which showed and explained the disbursement of the loan funds. Plaintiffs filed no 
opposing affidavit. From the undisputed facts, it is clear that the plaintiffs' Fourth 
Cause of Action was without merit. The Andersons' Complaint is dated April 27, 1981. 
Their counsel had over three week's notice of the motion before it was heard. The 
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Andersons' Reply Memorandum is dated N ovember23, 1981. The Anderson, therefore, had 
seven months in which to gather some ~vidence to support its Fourth Cause of Action. In 
fact, Anderson did not gather any evidence and had no evidence. The Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure require that a cause of action which cannot be supported by even one affidavit 
should be dismissed. Summary judgment is made for the purpose of eliminating those 
claims which in fact cannot be supported by one affidavit, such as the Anderson's Fourth 
Cause of Action and was properly granted here. 
fa, 
DATED this f 1. day of May, 1982. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
2 
I 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Brief of Respondent was mailed, po.stage fully prepaid, on the / 17'-day of May, 1982, 
to Gerald E. Nielson, Attorney for Anderson, 3737 Honeycutt Road, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84106. 
y I / 1/·· 
. I . jl j 
1 
-17-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
